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The Present Personal is a book of our time. Written 
in Israel, The Present Personal begins with an honest 
confession: “Living in Tel Aviv, in Israel, it has been 
impossible to alleviate the darkness of this period, one 
during which violence, hatred, intense human 
suffering together with the growing indifference 
toward the suffering of others has become the form of 
daily life” (Kenaan, 2004, p. iii). Despite the 
darkening situation that “threatens to leave the 
engagement with humanistic work bereft of any 
genuine value”, The Present Personal makes a 
philosophical attempt to capture the personal at the 
very heart of the structural at a time when the singular 
seems either to have disappeared into the 
propositional, or to have taken flight into a more 
radical non-propositional it.  
 
The opening section, “Philosophy and the Personal”, 
gives a general introduction to the subject matter and 
the scope of the book in terms of one of its prime 
motifs, namely, an attempt at thinking philosophically 
about a situation that philosophy has stopped 
bothering about, “the problem of prioritizing the 
language of information in which the individual is 
irrelevant”. 
 
Chapter 1, headed “Language and the Bell Jar” 
(comprising sub-sections titled “A Picture Held Us 
Captive”,  “Language Frame”, “The Fact of the 
Propositional”, “This Is How Things Are”, and “The 
Bell Jar”), echoes the central concern of the book: 
language itself is rooted in those very intimate 
idiosyncratic moments of our personal life when, if at 
all, we learn how to “read the face through that sad 
smile” and how to have a glimpse of the “you who 
speaks to me in and through what you speak”. Can the 
individual be brought back to language in a genuine 
way? Is philosophy the right place for the personal? If 
not, Kenaan wonders, why not?  
 
Philosophy’s blindness to the intimate-personal 
results from its typical way of understanding language 
and reality and its firm belief that language is a 
finished product always available for anyone’s use, as 
it remains completely external to the particularity or 
peculiarity of our intrinsic attachment to our words. 
The hegemony of the propositional and the factual 
structure is the only way of structuring our 
information. Meaning, when divorced from our 
particularity, is derived from more fundamental 
meaning structures, that is, from facts that, as Russell 
puts it, simply “are what they are”. “Language and the 
Bell Jar” also lets us know how the philosophy of 
language, especially the Anglo-American tradition of 
philosophy, always censors the personal with its 
position that the public structure of the language is the 
ultimate condition of the individual. You feel 
imprisoned and yet you see no walls around you. Is 
this the kind of captivity, Kenaan ponders, that 
Wittgenstein had in mind when he speaks of showing 
the “fly the way out of the fly-bottle”? The irony is, 
as Wittgenstein makes us see, that we cannot see it as 
a picture. As it loses its touch of that from which it 
grew, language can return to meet itself only in a very 
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narrow form. And when it returns to the home of 
language as an outsider, “it can only see what 
outsiders see [when facing a home]: a picture” 
(Kenaan, 2004, p. vi). What is thus lost is the actual 
character of the human possibility of allowing the 
textuality of language to contain, as Plato has it, the 
texture of things. In Plato’s Sophist, for instance, one 
of the important lessons Theatatus learns from the 
Eleatic stranger is that language can only convey a 
logos through a particular intervening of its elements. 
“It conceals a difference, an invisible difference 
whose presence explains why when we say such daily 
things as ‘it is raining again’, ‘I miss you’, ‘Dinner is 
ready’, ‘You are beautiful’, we are usually not at all 
saying that this is how things are” (Kenaan, 2004, p. 
vi). Kenaan rightly observes: “It locks us in that 
shifting domain of virtual possibilities that Sylvia 
Plath, for example, termed the ‘bell jar’.” Yet, due to 
the transparency of the bell jar, we are so often 
tempted to forget our captivity, to forget that the 
possibility exists for us to escape. 
 
Chapter  2  (“The Limits of Language and the Dream 
of Transcendence”) deals with sub-topics such as 
“Philosophy and Disappointment”, “Language: The 
Map”, “Language and Silence: The Example of 
Abraham”, “The Limits of Language and the 
Question of Freedom”, “Before the Law of 
Language” and “From Disappointment to 
Philosophy”, and begins with a discussion of 
Kierkegaard’s existential critique of language and the 
ways in which the propositional structure of language 
does not allow the spoken words to reflect the 
singularity of the self. This chapter is a fusion of the 
traditions of Continental and Anglo-American 
philosophy, J. L. Austin, Kant, Kierkegaard and 
Heidegger, as well as literary works by Kafka and 
Kundera, among others. Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard 
and Heidegger recognized man’s impulse to run up 
against the limits of language. For Kierkegaard, too, 
philosophy creates disappointment through the 
character and form of its language, because of its 
false appearance as ‘contentful’. In Fear and 
Trembling, Kierkegaard takes Abraham as a person 
who understands an act that is meaningful in a 
manner transcending language. “To exist under the 
guidance of pure thought is like travelling in 
Denmark with the help of a small map of Europe on 
which Denmark shows no larger than a steel pen-
point, aye, it is still more impossible” (Kierkegaard, 
1941, p. 55). Even in Kierkegaard, where, because of 
his Hegelian commitment, the individual becomes 
problematic, what is ultimately created is the 
authentic possibility of a paradox. For him, 
individuality is a project that must be undertaken in 
spite of language. In Kafka’s Before the Law, the man 
from the country never tries to actually enter the gate; 
instead, he seeks permission from the door keeper, as 
for him these limits have an absolute value and his 
desire to enter cannot be realized. Like Kafka’s man, 
Kierkegaard’s disappointment with language is a 
result of having allowed language to determine the 
horizons of his freedom. He has adopted the structure 
of language as the structure of his own expectations: 
that we should also transform this disappointing ode 
into a joyous one of creativity, and that its limit is the 
place for language to become creative. 
 
Chapter 3, entitled “Austin’s Fireworks”, follows five 
sub-themes – “Austin’s Fireworks: The Promise of 
the Pragmatic Turn”, “How to Do Things with 
Austin”, “The Act of Speech”, “The Pragmatic and 
the Personal”, “The Mirror at Hand: Afterthoughts” – 
and is an elucidation not only of “Austin’s Fireworks” 
that illuminated the hidden ground of personal 
language in our actions and deeds and in actual 
utterances that depart from a narrow semantic 
language picture, but it is also an act of re-ordering 
priorities in which the abstract intelligibility of the 
cognitive is shown as a derivative mode of 
interpretation. Surprisingly enough, even in Austin, 
the question of the personal, of the speaker’s singular 
presence in the things s/he says, is not an issue. 
Kenaan observes that this is “because Austin is 
committed to a conception of intelligibility that is 
essentially public, average and general despite a 
general shift away from the model of fact depiction. 
Illocutionary acts are conventional acts of shared 
meaning. Shared performatory acts between speakers 
and hearers stem from interaction between 
structurally identical linguistic agents, between 
members of a linguistic community for whom sharing 
a Life World means having an equivalent standing 
within a uniform, homogeneous domain of 
intelligibility” (Kenaan, 2004, p. 21). Thus the speech 
act utterances constituting the propositional core in 
turn give meaning to the speech act. 
 
Chapter 4 (“Personal Objects”), which deals with 
“Heidegger (Before) and (After) Austin”, 
“Heidegger’s Pragmatic Interpretation of the 
Ordinary”, “The Prison of the Ordinary”, “The 
Aesthetic Elision of the Personal”, “Van Gogh’s 
Shoes” and “Sabina’s Hat”, is a comparison of two 
other attempts to subvert the "hegemony of content": 
the poetic path of Heidegger who insists that “Truth is 
never gathered from objects that are present and 
ordinary” (Heidegger, 1975, p. 35), and the literary 
path of Kundera whose novels in particular unveil the 
hidden authentic person at the very heart of the 
ordinary provided that one has ‘eyes to see’ and ‘ears 
to listen’ to the way living language breathes. The 
ordinary is not a positive manifestation of Da-sein’s 
being-in-the-world. For Kundera, and also for 
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Kenaan, in order to encounter the personal we need to 
learn to recognize the singularity of existence in a pair 
of shoes or in a hat. We need to listen to the poetic 
voice of the ordinary, to see how the ordinary is 
poetic. 
 
Chapter 5, entitled “Language Unframed: Beauty as 
Model”, which incorporates sections such as “It’s 
Funny”, “Aesthetic Judgment”, “The Language of 
Taste” and “The Phenomenality of Your Words”, 
fuses phenomenology and aesthetics by turning to 
Kant and discovering an analogy between the 
experience of meaning in language and the aesthetic 
experience of encountering beauty. Kenaan interprets 
Kant’s attention to the particularity of the aesthetic as 
a gesture of resistance to the uniformity of the 
propositional.  
 
Under the rubric “Personal Time”, Chapter 6, which 
comprises “The Time Is Past”, “Time and the 
Language of Possibility”, “Time Prefaced”, “Perhaps 
Present” and “In My End is My Beginning”, ponders 
deeply the nuanced dimensions of time, from both a 
quantitative and a qualitative perspective. Usually 
time, for us, is available as a commodity of some sort: 
it is ours on condition that we make proper use of it or 
we miss it, lose it; we possess time by consuming it. 
In such a language, however, we not only remain 
strangers to the “invisible progress”, to cite Bergson, 
“of the past growing into the future”, but, 
furthermore, Kenaan laments, we erase the essential 
uniqueness of our personal involvement in “the 
unfolding of our time as a lifetime – the singular life 
that is yours, hers or mine”. Kenaan needs an 
alternate time-frame to the propositional one that can 
do justice to “time prefaced”, to see that the language 
of the “Preface” has a peculiar temporal constitution, 
the way the Preface to any text is just an in-
betweenness in which there is a merger of two distinct 
horizons of time: the clock time and the public 
reading of time as opposed to the time that is intimate 
and personal. Kenaan makes an effort at 
understanding Wittgenstein in his relation to the 
“present-personal”, by locating his words within the 
context of four other philosophical prefaces in which 
a philosopher thematizes his work in relation to the 
pending horizons of time. All these philosophers, 
from Descartes to Kant, from Heidegger to Quine and 
then to Wittgenstein, have combined these two 
distinct horizons of time in their “Preface-Time”; 
authentically or inauthentically, the journey toward 
authenticity, and toward unveiling the mask of the 
personal over and above the structural, continues. 
Kenaan waits patiently to unmask the hidden face of 
language, so that the personal voice of the 
philosopher can still be heard – if we allow it to be 
heard!  
With this magnifying glass at his disposal, Kenaan 
remains receptive to the concrete dimension of 
meaning, of language and of time, that is disclosed in 
the process. What, Kenaan wonders, is striking in 
these very words of Descartes’s prelude to the 
Mediations (1642)? What does it say about man’s 
relation to time? Descartes lets us know: “I realized 
that it was necessary, once in the course of my life, to 
demolish everything completely and start again right 
from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything 
at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last. 
But the task looked an enormous one, and I began to 
wait until I should reach a mature enough age to 
ensure that no subsequent time of life would be more 
suitable for tackling such inquiries. This led me to put 
the project off for so long that I would now be to 
blame if by pondering over it any further I wasted the 
time still left for carrying it out” (Descartes, 1990, p. 
212). Immanuel Kant’s preface to the Critique of 
Judgment (1783) has its own personal touch, being a 
project undertaken despite ‘time running out of hand’. 
Kant gives the final finishing touch to his own work, 
at the same time constrained by the limited time-
resources that he has in hand. Kant is in a hurry to 
give the book its final shape: “With this then I 
conclude my entire critical enterprise, I shall proceed 
without delay to the doctrinal one, in order to snatch 
from my advancing years what time may yet be 
somewhat favourable to the task” (Kant, 1987, pp.7-
8). In Kenaan’s reading, both Descartes and Kant 
attend to their philosophical project with a clear 
understanding that time is running out. Doing 
philosophy in the face of finitude, Descartes speaks 
from the ‘now’ of the philosophy project, that he 
cannot delay it any more: the work has to begin at 
some point in time. Kant looks at the same project 
from the perspective of its completion: he looks 
forward to its proper ending. For both, the horizon of 
time is still open, but neither can take for granted that 
it will continue to be open for long. Time is what runs 
out.  
 
In the preface to the seventh edition of Being and 
Time (1953), Martin Heidegger writes: “While the 
previous editions have borne the designation ‘First 
Half’, this has now been deleted. After a quarter of a 
century, the second half could no longer be added 
unless the first were to be presented anew. Yet, the 
road it has taken remains even today a necessary one, 
if our Da-sein is to be stirred by the question of 
Being” (Heidegger, 1971, p. xvii). The crux of 
Heidegger’s preface is an announcement of a change, 
of a ‘turning point’, “in relation to the work he had 
written a quarter of a century before”, Kenaan 
observes. After this prolonged time gap, nothing new 
could be done. Once time was past, it was futile for 
him to pursue the initial objective of his project. W. 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 8, Edition 1   May 2008  Page 4 of 5 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Johannesburg in South Africa and Edith Cowan University’s Faculty 
of Regional Professional Studies in Australia. This document is subject to copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any 
medium without the express permission of the publishers. 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
 
 
V. O. Quine’s preface to the Second Edition of the 
Pursuit of Truth (1992) brings the abstract and the 
spatial dimension of time to the forefront. For Quine, 
“time can become meaningful only in the form of an 
abstract, public, and entirely homogeneous scale, in 
which a sequence of uniformly vacant moments are 
always waiting – and always in the same manner – to 
be used up and filled in with contents”. We are 
informed about his engagement with time in the 
Preface: “In May 1990, a mere four months after this 
book first appeared, I was in the gallant little 
Republic of San Marino for a week-long international 
colloquium on my philosophy. Six months later I was 
in mediaeval Gerona, in Catalonia, giving the Joseph 
Ferrater Mora Lectures – fifteen hours of them and 
five of discussion. The busy months of preparation 
and the stimulating exchanges on these occasions 
sparked thoughts that would have made for a better 
book if the chronology had been inverted. I am 
approximating such an inversion as best as I can by 
this early revised edition” (Quine, 1992). 
 
Kenaan has rightly observed that, in Quine’s 
assessment of time, “all points on the time axis appear 
to have the same logical status, they are denied any 
differences crucial to the way we experience time, 
between the kinds of events that past, present and 
future have in our lives. With this kind of alignment 
of time with space, time here becomes space-like. 
‘Tense gives way to ‘now’, then, before t, at t, after t, 
‘I will not do it again’ becomes, ‘I will not do it after 
now’, ‘do’ being taken tenselessly and the future 
force of will translated into a phase after now. ” 
Quine thus represents time in a manner that has no 
trace of the flowing character of time. While Quine’s 
spatial language can represent “any desired duration 
and any desired position along the time axis, it 
completely obliterates any sign of duration itself, or 
of what Bergson calls durée”, Kenaan continues. This 
is the background that needs another version of ‘lived 
time’ to that encountered in Wittgenstein’s frustrating 
efforts at concrete and existential representation of 
time, the version needed being of a dimension of time 
that is lived intimately and personally. In this context 
only, Wittgenstein speaks of a different kind of 
‘impossibility’ that is not directly tied to the fact that 
a person’s life must ultimately come to an end. When 
Wittgenstein writes in the preface of his 
Philosophical Investigations, “I should have liked to 
produce a good book. This has not come about, but 
the time is past in which I could improve it” 
(Wittgenstein, 1984, p. 48), what does Wittgenstein 
mean by "time"? Kenaan concludes: “In ‘time is past’ 
Wittgenstein here speaks of an impossibility whose 
internal form is the form of his entangled relationship 
with lived time, a relationship of which the language 
of the universal clock leaves no trace” (Kenaan, 2004, 
p. 61). That the impossible version of it could not 
have been written any more is the tension in these two 
senses of understanding time. Wittgenstein speaks of 
a person who has once claimed his future – a future 
that, in the flow of time, has become empty, a once 
pregnant time now turned barren. This tension 
between the private and the public sense of time, and 
the fact that an open possibility withers and falls into 
an abstract reservoir of biographical counterfactuals, 
is an ordering part of possibility once opened to us 
which now has lost its potentiality: ‘now it is too late 
for that’. When we speak of a possibility no longer 
open to us, we return to time as a frame of reference, 
implying that the time frame available to us is not 
sufficient. 
 
There is the philosophical pre-saying that comes 
before philosophy speaks. Since the language of the 
personal is one that refuses to be a part of the global 
order of the thinkable, the presence of the personal 
may be easier to detect by focusing on the prefatory 
language we find in the preface. Not much interested 
in the time frame still available to him, Wittgenstein 
is more concerned with the actual passing of time 
within this time frame, the way time makes its 
presence felt, the way time is allowed to appear as a 
mere lacuna, but a meaningful one at that. 
Wittgenstein’s pronouncement of a concrete limit to 
his writing is his bewilderment at the presence of a 
concrete impossibility that has become an important 
part of his life and yet bears no logical necessity and 
cannot be inferred from facts of his own biography. 
Kenaan observes that “This impossibility does not 
stem from that fact or another but grows out of the 
temporal unfolding of his existence, his being in time, 
the story of a life” (p. 63). In time past, Wittgenstein 
speaks of an impossibility whose internal form is the 
form of his entangled relationship with lived time, a 
relationship of which the language of the universal 
clock leaves no trace. “I should have liked to produce 
a good book. This has not come about, but the time is 
past in which I could improve”. For Wittgenstein, the 
passing of time connotes a personal failure. However, 
whereas Wittgenstein finds himself captured by time, 
the weight of time constitutes no burden for 
Heidegger, whose personal preface is, like his 
philosophical work, entirely future oriented. In the 
Epilogue, Kenaan reiterates this claim: “to listen to 
the personal is to be open to the resonance of an 
irresolvable tension in a person’s language”. This is a 
tension between the public uniformity of a person’s 
words and the utterly private roots these words have 
in our life world. Calling for a phenomenology of the 
tension between the individual and her language, 
Kenaan writes: “It is in this tension that the personal 
is present. This tension is where the personal lives” 
(p. 182). 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 8, Edition 1   May 2008  Page 5 of 5 
 
 
We have undertaken our journey toward this 
uncharted destination following Kenaan till the end. 
With Kenaan, we have made our way through the 
opening of Descartes’s Mediations, the preface to 
Kant’s Third Critique, the preface to Heidegger’s 
seventh edition of Being and Time and Quine’s 
preface to the second edition of the Pursuit of Truth, 
and then again through what Wittgenstein writes in 
the preface of his Philosophical Investigations. Was it 
a worthwhile journey? Has Hagi Kenaan succeeded in 
tapping the hidden and very fragile voice of the 
personal in the midst of the structural? Perhaps it is 
left for us to decide. By juxtapositioning the personal 
and the routine horizons of their time, Kenaan has 
prepared the stage for a direct encounter between us, 
the readers, and them, our favourite authors and the 
model thinkers, and in this intimate mode of sharing 
one another we could have a glimpse of the ‘they who 
speak to us’ in and through ‘what they speak’, both 
intimately and professionally, because that is the way 
they present themselves to us! Hagi Kenaan has 
successfully played the role of a mediator and a 
guide. It is no exaggeration if we say that, in one 
magical stroke, Kenaan’s re-conceptualization of 
philosophy's approach to language could free the 
contingent singularity of language while at the same 
time permitting it to continue to dwell within the 
confines of content. Hagi Kenaan has achieved his 
goal in making them – ‘they who speak to us’ – 
present, and they, in their turn, have mesmerized us 
by the sheer force of their presence. 
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